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NOTES
THE LIFE & TIMES OF A CERCLA CLAIM
IN BANKRUPTCY: AN EXAMINATION OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
Heightened awareness of the health and environmental risks
posed by exposure to hazardous substances prompted Congress in
1980 to enact the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 1 CERCLA's aims are to
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988). CERCLA was enacted in response to the highly publi-
cized environmental disasters that culminated in 1978 at Love Canal, New York. See SEN-
ATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE
ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) ("[S]hocking incidents at Love Canal
gained wide attention and propelled the problems of inadequate hazardous chemical waste
disposal into the national spotlight . . . ."). In 1978 President Carter declared a national
emergency at Love Canal, New York, resulting in the evacuation of hundreds of residents at
the government's expense. See Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Dis-
posers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. Rav. 949, 949-50 n.1-4 (1980). It was discovered
that the town of Love Canal was built on a landfill containing highly toxic chemicals that
could cause birth defects, epilepsy, and other diseases. See Theodore Baurer, Love Canal:
Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVTL. L. 133, 136 (1980).
CERCLA was the first federal statute to respond directly to the release of hazardous
substances into the environment. See Ridgway M. Hall, Jr. & Nancy S. Bryson, Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, in EMPLOYEE LAW HAND-
BOOK 109 (8th ed. 1985). Prior to CERCLA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA) was the major vehicle for federal enforcement of environmental laws. See H.R.
REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
RCRA, however, proved inadequate to deal with the consequences of waste disposal prac-
tices known as the "inactive hazardous waste site problem." Id. at 17-18, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. CERCLA, while certainly the most comprehensive, is not the only
federal statute aimed at protecting the public and the environment. See, e.g., The Toxic
Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988) (regulating manufacture
and distribution of new chemicals and monitoring all chemicals currently in use); The Clean
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protect the public health and safety and to rectify environmental
damage by authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") to remove hazardous waste at dump sites and to assess
related cleanup costs against the responsible parties. 2 However, the
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988) (regulating air pollution standards); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1976) (regulating drinking water standards). States have
added their own environmental statutes to complement existing federal laws. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 43-2901 to 43-2922 (1986 & Supp. I 1991) (Georgia Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Act); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2C-1 to 26-25 (West 1987 & Supp. I 1991) (Air Pollution
Control (1954)); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.75 to 143-215.9411 (1990 & Supp. I 1991) (Oil
Pollution and Hazardous Substances Control Act of 1978).
Although CERCLA is the most commonly invoked environmental statute, it has been
characterized as "badly drafted and ... silent on more important issues." David E. Jones &
Kyle E. McSlarrow .... But Were Afraid to Ask: Superfund Case Law, 1981-89, 19 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10430, 10430 (1989).
2 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA establishes a program for environmental
response action to protect public health and the environment from the dangers of hazardous
waste sites. Id. § 9602. The government can clean up the waste site itself or seek an injunc-
tion requiring the responsible parties to remove the waste. Id. § 9604. Section 9607 lists
which "responsible parties" can be held liable under CERCLA. Id. § 9607. It provides, in
pertinent part:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
-party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruc-
tion, or loss resulting from such a release.
Id. CERCLA established a "Superfund" to finance the cleanup operations by authorizing
the government, or an innocent third party, to abate the danger and receive reimbursement
for response costs directly from the fund. Id. §§ 9611, 9631. The Superfund serves to avoid
lengthy and expensive litigation against an environmental polluter by providing prompt
payment to the party who incurred cleanup costs. The Fund then assesses the costs against
the responsible party. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 1, at 17-18, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6134, 6136 (purpose of Superfund is to pursue rapid recovery of
cleanup costs and to impose strict liability against responsible party). The Superfund is
partly funded by imposing an excise tax on the oil and petro-chemical industries on the
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staggering costs associated with environmental liability3 have led
many individuals and corporations to seek bankruptcy protection
from the financial burden of CERCLA claims.4 Filing for bank-
ruptcy protection allows a party with CERCLA liability in exis-
tence prior to filing ("pre-petition") to emerge from the proceed-
ings discharged of this liability.5 In addition, the filing of the
theory that those who benefit from creating waste should bear the costs. See 26 U.S.C: §§
4611, 4661 (1988). The Fund originally appropriated $1.6 billion for cleanup actions. The
amount was raised to $8.5 billion with the passage of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
' See PRACTICING LAW INST., THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 12 (1990). "The costs of studying and remediating sites is also increasing
rapidly. The estimated average cost of the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study ('RI/
FS') is approximately $1 million. The estimated average cost of implementing remedial ac-
tion is approximately $25 million, although there are many instances of cost estimates rang-
ing far in excess of $100 million." Id.; see also In re Charles George Land Reclamation
Trust, 30 B.R. 918, 920-21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (estimating cleanup costs at $5-10 mil-
lion); 1A FRANK P. GRAD, A TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02[4], at 4A-141 (1990)
(noting expense of cleanup costs); Charles McCoy, Exxon Corp.'s Settlement Gets Court
Approval, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1991, at A3 (Exxon Corp. settled Alaskan Oil spill for $1.05
billion-estimates for total damage range from $3 billion to $10 billion); Daniel Wise,
Courts Rule on Clean-up Costs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3 (estimating $60 billion in
cleanup costs by year 2000).
' See Norman I. Silber, Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 870, 871 n.14 (1985).
5 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727 (1988). Section 524 outlines the effect of a discharge in
bankruptcy. Id. Only those debts arising prior to the bankruptcy filing ("pre-petition") are
dischargeable. See In re Neier, 45 B.R. 740, 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). The exceptions to
the discharge are listed in § 523 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988). Among other things,
the Code excepts alimony payments, money obtained under "false pretenses," and certain
taxes, fines, and penalties, but there is no exception for environmental claims. Id.
For bankruptcy purposes, a debt is a liability on a claim, and such claim is governed by
the provisions of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988). When the government cleans up a
waste site created by the debtor, the government becomes a creditor, and the debtor is
obligated to repay the government for its response costs. See 11 U.S.C. § 9607. An environ-
mental liability is treated as any other debt, and consequently, the government is treated as
an unsecured creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988); Douglas G. Baird, Environmental
Regulation, Bankruptcy Law, and the Problem of Limited Liability, 18 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) at 10352-53 (1988).
One of the goals behind the Bankruptcy Code is to relieve the debtor of past obliga-
tions. DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY § 26.8 (1990). Before this goal
can be accomplished, creditors' claims must be satisfied. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a). The gath-
ering in, or "marshalling," process aids in distributing the debtor's assets efficiently and
equitably to creditors so that the debtor can begin a "new life." See In re Coombs, 86 B.R.
314, 318 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
One of the basic purposes of the former Bankruptcy Act, as well as the present Bank-
ruptcy Code, is to give the debtor a "new opportunity in life and a clear future for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." See Lines v.
Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19-20 (1970); see also BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK,
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 8.23[5] (1986) ("Confirmation of a plan marks the beginning of
19931
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bankruptcy petition blocks creditors' efforts to enforce their pre-
petition claims by imposing an automatic stay on most legal pro-
ceedings against the debtor.'
Since CERCLA claims are subject to the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code,7 the government is impeded in its ability to col-
lect response costs and to issue cleanup orders when the responsi-
ble party is a debtor in bankruptcy." Thus, the Bankruptcy Code's
the reorganized debtor's new financial life.").
The Bankruptcy Code allows individuals to be discharged from debts in Chapter 7 liq-
uidation, Chapter 11 reorganization, and Chapter 13 debt adjustments. Corporations only
receive a discharge in Chapter 11 reorganizations. ID. 3.01. This Note will focus on the
interaction of CERCLA claims in Chapter 11 cases, both individual and corporate, unless
otherwise stated.
' See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). Basically, the automatic stay "stops collection efforts
pending a determination of the creditors' and debtors' rights by the bankruptcy court."
WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, T 1.09[1]. The automatic stay shields the debtor from
the financial pressures of having to answer its creditors' claims. See In re Stringer, 847 F.2d
549, 551 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, the stay benefits all creditors because it prevents a
scramble for the debtor's assets which would be detrimental to a creditor who was slow to
react to the bankruptcy. See Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1069 (5th Cir.
1986). Section 362 of the Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) [the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of]
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(a). There are exceptions to the automatic stay which permit the commence-
ment or continuation of certain actions notwithstanding the bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(b).
See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 278-83 (1985). The Supreme Court held in Kovacs
that Ohio's action to enforce an injunction against the debtor for polluting public waters
was a "claim" within the language of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore subject to the
provisions of the Code. Id. The Code defines "claim" broadly. Id. at 279. Section 101(4)
defines claim as follows:
(4) "claim" means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liqui-
dated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy or breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy
is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, secured, or unsecured;
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).
The moment a bankruptcy petition is filed an "estate" is created by operation of law,
which consists of all the interests in property previously owned by the debtor. See WEIN-
TRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, 1 4.03. Sections 541(b) and 522 list which property is ex-
cepted and exempted from the estate, respectively. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(b), 522.
1 See Michael B. Guss, Comment, Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict Between Federal
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goal of rehabilitating the fiscal health of financially troubled debt-
ors9 conflicts with CERCLA's equally important goals of protecting
the environment and promoting the public health and safety.10
Consequently, in attempting to resolve the various issues created
by CERCLA claims in bankruptcy proceedings, the courts have
reached divergent results.-"
The issues associated with these proceedings include (1)
whether the EPA's CERCLA claim arose pre-petition or post-peti-
tion; 1 2 (2) whether the claim should be accorded priority treatment
as an administrative expense;' s (3) whether the claim represents a
money judgment, a cleanup order, or merely an injunction to stop
polluting; 4 and (4) whether the bankruptcy trustee may abandon
contaminated property in order to avoid spending estate funds to
clean up the property."5
This Note will examine the conflicting policies raised by the
Bankruptcy Laws and State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1263, 1264-65
(1985). The government will not collect the full value of its claim if the debtor's assets are
insufficient to pay all of the claims asserted against the estate because the discharge will bar
further recovery after the bankruptcy proceedings. See supra note 5 (discussion of
discharge).
In addition, the automatic stay freezes the government's efforts to enforce CERCLA
claims. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 46-47 and accompany-
ing text (discussing exceptions to automatic stay on government units).
In addition, the trustee or debtor in possession can abandon property, even contami-
nated property, if it becomes burdensome to the estate, and the waste presents no "immi-
nent" danger to the public health and safety. See 11 U.S.C. § 554; infra notes 79-83 and
accompanying text.
' See In re Rusty Jones Inc., 110 B.R. 362, 375 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). The fundamen-
tal purpose of Chapter 11 is to "enable a distressed business operation to reorganize its
affairs in order to prevent the loss of jobs and the adverse economic effects Associated with
disposing of assets at their liquidation value." Id; see also In re Winshall Settlor's Trust,
758 F.2d 1136, 1137 (6th Cir. 1985) (purpose of Chapter 11 is to return on-going business to
viable state); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (legislative history states that
where possible, bankruptcy law favors rehabilitation over liquidation), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
10 See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 349-50 (D.N.J. 1991) (stat-
ing CERCLA's goal to protect public health and safety); H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 54-56 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836-38 ("The Superfund program
to clean-up abandoned hazardous waste sites is one of this Nation's most important envi-
ronmental programs designed to protect human health and the environment.").
" See generally Katherine S. Allen, Note, Belly Up Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcy
and Hazardous Waste Clean-up, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1037 (1985) (examining conflict between
Bankruptcy Code and hazardous waste law).
12 See infra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 49-76 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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foregoing issues and the disparate results reached by the courts.
Part One will discuss recent decisions that have determined when
a "claim" for environmental liability arises for purposes of deter-
mining dischargeability. In addition, Part One will propose that
post-petition cleanup costs should be given priority as an adminis-
trative expense even if the claim is deemed to have arisen prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Part Two will discuss the
governmental unit exception to the automatic stay provision and
suggest that although the government's order may be deemed an
attempt to enforce a money judgment, it is a valid exercise of the
government's police and regulatory power. Finally, Part Three will
examine the trustee's power to abandon contaminated property in
order to avoid cleanup costs.
I. CERCLA LIABILITY AS A BANKRUPTCY "CLAIM"
A. When Does a CERCLA Claim Arise?
The Bankruptcy Code's purpose of giving the debtor a "fresh
start" is effectuated by providing for the discharge of the debtor's
pre-petition debts."6 Therefore, it is essential to determine whether
a claim existed when the petition was filed, in order to assess its
dischargeability. However, the courts disagree as to whether a
CERCLA claim is "pre-petition" or "post-petition" when the gov-
ernment incurs post-petition response costs for the cleanup of a
,' 11 U.S.C. § 524. It is the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to discharge as many obliga-
tions as possible in order to allow the debtor to begin a new life. See NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) ("fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent the
debtor from going into liquidation"). The Code's fresh start objective is in the "public as
well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders
for distribution the property which he owns ... a new opportunity in life and a clear future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (referring to the Bankruptcy Act-the Code's prede-
cessor); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 524.01[1] (15th ed. 1993) (citing legislative his-
tory which stated "purpose of legislation is to effectuate ... the discharge in bankruptcy by
rendering it less subject to abuse by harassing creditors").
Legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to construe "claim" broadly so
that "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent will be able to
be dealt with in the bankruptcy proceedings." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5787, 5808; H.R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5963, 6266. By broadly defining "claim," "the
Code aims to provide more complete relief for the debtor, since claims that would have
remained outstanding under previous bankruptcy law are now subject to the discharge."
Lori Jonas, Note, Dividing the Toxic Pie: Why Superfund Contingent Contribution Claims
Should Not Be Barred by the Bankruptcy Code, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 867 (1991).
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waste site in existence prior to the bankruptcy. 17 In fact, the pres-
ence of a hazardous waste site is often not discovered until some
time after the bankruptcy proceeding has been initiated; thus, the
EPA will not have taken any action in response, including the fil-
ing of a claim against the debtor.'
While a few courts have held that a CERCLA claim does not
arise until response costs are actually incurred, 9 the majority of
courts have determined that a claim accrues when the underlying
acts giving rise to the claim occur-such as a spill or leakage.20
In In re Chateaugay Corp. ("LTV"), 21 the Second Circuit ex-
amined costs incurred by the EPA after the debtor's bankruptcy
filing, which were in response to pre-petition conduct.22 The EPA
argued that since the cleanup was undertaken after the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed, its claims for reimbursement arose post-
petition and thus were not subject to discharge. 23 The Second Cir-
cuit disagreed, holding that when a "release or threatened release"
of hazardous waste occurs prior to bankruptcy, the existence of the
hazardous condition gives rise to a pre-petition "contingent" claim
for cleanup costs that is dischargeable in bankruptcy.24 The Sec-
ond Circuit based its decision on the Code's broad definition of
"claim" which includes any "right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, con-
" See infra notes 19-30; Richard P. Krasnow, Environmental Issues in a Bankruptcy
or Reorganizational Proceeding: A Bankruptcy Lawyer's Perspective, 18 ENVTL. L. REP.
10355, 10357 (1988).
18 See,e.g., In re Torwico Elecs, Inc., 131 B.R. 561, 562-63 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991), rev'd in
part, vacated in part, No. CIV 92-1828, 1992 WL 465754 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1992); see also
Jonas, supra note 16, at 857 n.56.
1 See, e.g., Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316
(9th Cir. 1986); Bulk Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1450-52
(S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.N.J. 1983); see also In re
Remington Rand Corp., 836 F.2d 825, 833 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (deciding government does not
have claim until aware of its "right to payment"); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.) (ruling asbestos exposure does not give rise to cause of action
until injury discovered), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
20 See In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 32 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (noting "claim arises based
upon the debtor's conduct"); see also 1A GRAD, supra note 3, § 4A.02[4] at 4A-148.1-148.2
(discussing courts' analysis of when CERCLA claim arises).
21 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
22 Id. at 1000.
23 Id. Post-petition claims are not dischargeable. See Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989, 993
(8th Cir. 1990); In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1990).
24 Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. The release or threatened release of hazardous waste
is the triggering event which results in a future right to payment (a "contingent" claim). Id.
at 999.
1993]
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tingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equita-
ble, [etc.]."' 25 Thus, the LTV court held that a CERCLA claim
arises at the moment the statute is violated since a violation gives
the government a right to payment; the court recognized, however,
that it was choosing an arbitrary point in time.26
Although the approach taken in LTV appears to be the emerg-
ing trend, it has not been universally adopted. In United States v.
Union Scrap Iron & Metal,27 the district court held that a release
or threatened release of hazardous waste prior to bankruptcy does
not give rise to a contingent claim until the government actually
incurs response costs.28 The court concluded that nonbankruptcy
substantive law defines when a claim arises;29 under CERCLA and
the relevant substantive law, a cause of action only exists when
response costs are incurred. 0
It is submitted that the underlying acts approach taken by the
majority of courts extends the Code's definition of claim beyond
that intended, to the detriment of CERCLA and the environment.
25 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1988) (emphasis added); see also supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text (discussing "claim").
26 See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. The Second Circuit agreed with the district
court's determination that "[t]his ruling covers releases that ... have not ... [yet] been
discovered by [the] EPA (or anyone else)." Id. at 1000; see also In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 33
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) ("[Cllaim arises for purposes of discharge upon the actual or
threatened release of hazardous waste by the debtor."). But see In re M. Frenville Co., Inc.,
744 F.2d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1984) (determination of when claim arises dependent on when
cause of action brought), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
217 123 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
28 Id. at 835-36. The EPA sought approximately $1.2 million in response costs from the
debtor and numerous other defendants for the improper storage and leakage of lead and
other hazardous materials into the soil and water. Id. at 832-33. The leakage began prior to
the bankruptcy filing; however, the EPA did not find the contaminated property until after
the bankruptcy filing. Moreover, some sites were not found until after confirmation of the
plan of reorganization. Id. at 834. The court rejected the debtor's argument that the EPA
had a "contingent" claim at the time of the filing since, such a claim requires that both the
EPA and the debtor have previously contemplated the occurrence of some future event,
such as leakage, which would give rise to the debtor's obligation to pay. Id. at 836. The court
held that neither the EPA nor the debtor had "actual or presumed contemplation" of the
leakage at the site in question. Id.
29 Id. at 835.
30 Id. The court stated that a claim does not exist until all the elements necessary to
create a legal obligation exist under the relevant substantive nonbankruptcy law. Id. Under
CERCLA, four elements must be established to give rise to a legal obligation: "(1) there
must be a facility; (2) there must be a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
at the facility; (3) there must be a responsible person... ; and (4) the United States must
have incurred necessary costs in responding to the release at the facility." Id. The last ele-
ment - incurring response costs - had not been met at the time of the bankruptcy filing;
therefore, no legal obligation existed under CERCLA. Id. at 836.
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Such a broad definition of "claim" allows debtors to discharge
CERCLA liability that the creditor (EPA) is unaware of and thus,
unable to file a claim for in the proceeding. Consequently, such
"claims" will often not receive any payments under the
bankruptcy.
In addition, while the Code requires notice to creditors with
possible claims against the debtor, such notice is useless to the
EPA, as a creditor, without knowledge of the debtor's potential
CERCLA liability. Allowing the discharge of unknown claims thus
vitiates the Code's requirement of notice to creditors. Moreover,
such a policy will encourage debtors to file bankruptcy before the
EPA becomes aware of CERCLA violations in order to avoid allo-
cating resources to the partial payment of such claims.
On the other hand, it is submitted that limiting the dis-
chargeability of CERCLA claims to those that the EPA has re-
sponded to properly balances the policies underlying CERCLA and
the Code. Such an approach will actually encourage a potentially
responsible party to apprise the EPA of all of its waste sites in
order to maximize the dischargeability of CERCLA claims. Thus,
the EPA will be in a position to respond to environmental hazards
more quickly because the debtor will only be able to discharge
claims associated with the cleanup of sites of which the EPA had
actual notice prior to the bankruptcy.
Moreover, by establishing that a CERCLA claim only arises
after the government incurs cleanup costs, it is submitted that
debtors, as well as creditors, will be induced to prevent environ-
mental violations if the scope of the discharge provision is nar-
rowed.3 ' To the extent CERCLA claims are not dischargeable, gen-
', See Robert Funsten & Alejandro Hernandez, The Toxic Waste Generator in Bank-
ruptcy: Should Environmental Cleanup Costs Be Given a Priority?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
108, 120. "Because [industrial waste generators] are most often the cause of the problems
that lead to response cost liability, they are the cheapest and most efficient parties to rem-
edy hazardous waste problems ab initio." Id. By placing the risk on those responsible for
the pollution, the social costs are internalized. See Allen, supra note 11, at 1074 ("One of
the goals of CERCLA, in fact, is to achieve [the] internalization of social costs, forcing the
price of goods connected with hazardous waste to reflect the inevitable cleanup costs."). The
externalities of pollution (costs unreflected in the price of a product) are effectively incurred
by the responsible parties. Id. This will lead to higher production costs and therefore give
the polluters an economic incentive to reduce pollution. See id. at 1073. See generally WER-
NER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONoMIcs: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 8-11, 213-35 (1979) (dis-
cussing externalities and economic analysis of environmental pollution). Optimal resource
allocation demands that those who pollute and those who are affected "take into account all
external effects related to their resource decisions." Id. at 215.
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eral unsecured creditors will receive less under the bankruptcy. 2
Therefore, prior to entering into an agreement with a possible pol-
luter, a creditor will be more likely to require that funds be set
aside or insurance be obtained for future environmental liability in
order to ensure that the government's claim does not adversely af-
fect the creditor's interest.3 3 Faced with more stringent require-
ments in its business dealings, a debtor will have an economic in-
centive not to pollute.3 4
B. CERCLA Claims as an Administrative Expense
Another important issue concerning CERCLA claims is
whether the EPA's response costs should receive priority as an ad-
ministrative expense when the government, itself, undertakes to
clean up a waste site.3 5 Administrative expenses must be paid in
full before any general unsecured claims are satisfied" because
they are the "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate. 3 7 If the release of hazardous substances occurred post-
petition, courts generally agree that a claim for cleanup costs is
related to "preserving the estate," and the cost is therefore consid-
32 See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) ("[Slecured and unsecured creditors . . . become liable for the cost of cleanup
merely by extending credit to a corporation which unknown to them should in the future
violate the Law.").
" See, e.g., Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., Inc. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding CERCLA claims covered by comprehensive general liability insurance policy);
Savoy Medical Supply Co., Inc. v. F & H Mfg. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(same). See generally 1A GRAD, supra note 3, § 4A.02[5], at 4A-148.2 (financial responsibil-
ity and insurance requirements under RCRA and CERCLA).
'" See Allen, supra note 11, at 1073 ("Because credit would be more difficult to obtain,
the cost of hazardous waste disposal would increase.").
" See generally Funsten & Hernandez, supra note 31, at 108. The issue of whether to
accord an environmental claim priority over other claims arises because the monetary sums
are often significant and can therefore adversely affect both the debtor's ability to reorgan-
ize and the unsecured creditors prospects of collecting on their claims. Funsten & Her-
nandez, supra note 31, at 125-26; see also In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th
Cir. 1988) (cleanup costs estimated between $10 and $30 million, unencumbered assets of $3
million).
36 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (a)(1) (1988); 3 COLLIER, supra note 16, 503.03 at 503.14; WEIN-
TRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, 1 5.08 (discussing different types of administrative costs).
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988). Section 503(b)(1)(A) allows as administrative
expenses, "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including
wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case."
Id. By giving certain creditors administrative priority, they are encouraged to engage in
transactions with the debtor, and this in turn helps to facilitate the rehabilitation of a busi-
ness. See Trustees of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin's, Inc., 789 F.2d 98, 101 (2d Cir.
1986); 3 COLLIER, supra note 16, 503.04[1][a][i] at 503.23.
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ered an administrative expense38
Less uniform, however, is the courts' treatment of post-peti-
tion response costs for the cleanup of pre-petition pollution. Some
courts view compliance with state and federal environmental stat-
utes as necessary to preserve the debtor's estate and therefore
treat the government's claim for response costs as an administra-
tive expense2" Other courts have refused to grant cleanup costs
administrative priority, contending that such costs are simply pre-
petition unsecured claims which share equally with other un-
secured creditors in the remainder of the debtor's estate.40
The better view is that costs of removing hazardous waste in-
curred post-petition are administrative expenses of the estate. If
the government cleans up a waste site prior to a bankruptcy filing,
its claim for response costs is clearly not entitled to administrative
priority because at the time of the cleanup, there was no estate to
preserve.41 However, if the government undertakes such removal
action after the debtor files for bankruptcy, its claim for reim-
bursement is properly attributable to "preserving the estate" be-
cause the debtor cannot continue its business operations while in
violation of environmental statutes. 42 Therefore, post-petition re-
38 See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Vernon
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 B.R. 580, 582 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re Security Gas & Oil,
Inc., 70 B.R. 786, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). Cleanup costs, however, do not qualify as
administrative expenses until costs are actually incurred. See In re MicroFab, Inc., 105 B.R.
161, 166 (Bankr. D.-Mass. 1989).
39 See, e.g., In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 831 F.2d 118, 124 (6th Cir. 1987); In
re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987) (pre-petition contamination will lead to adminis-
trative expense).
40 See In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying admin-
istrative priority to cleanup costs because conduct giving rise to cleanup costs occurred pre-
petition); Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (same). See
generally 1A GRAD, supra note 3, § 4A.02[4] at 4A-148.1 (discussing courts' treatment of
administrative expenses).
"I See WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, 4.01. Since an "estate" is created upon
the filing of a bankruptcy petition, if the government had initiated and completed its
cleanup action prior to the filing, such action would not be in furtherance of "preserving
the estate" and would be denied administrative priority. Id.
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988) (trustee and debtor in possession required to cpmply
with state laws); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985) (noting anyone in possession of
hazardous waste site must comply with environmental laws); United States v. Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1084 (3d Cir. 1987) (pending Chapter 11 petition did
not relieve company of legal obligation to comply with statutory, regulatory, or judicially
imposed obligations); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 87 B.R. 662, 665 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
Where the debtor has pre-petition liability for contaminated property and the government
cleans up the property post-petition, the government's claim should be paid as an adminis-
trative expense. Id. at 665. The debtor cannot continue operating without first complying
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sponse costs, including those stemming from pre-filing violations,
should be entitled to administrative expense priority.43
II. STAYING CERCLA CLAIMS-THE GOVERNMENTAL EXCEPTION
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic
stay on most legal proceedings instituted against the debtor based
on pre-petition claims." The automatic stay. relieves the debtor
from the pressures of creditors' collection efforts and provides for
the orderly administration of the estate for the benefit of all credi-
tors.45 The Code, however, provides exceptions to the automatic
stay whereby certain actions are allowed to be commenced or
maintained during the bankruptcy proceedings.46
Section 362(b)(4) allows the bankruptcy court to lift the stay
in order for a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory
powers.47  However, the government is prevented by section
with federal and state statutes. Id. To allow the debtor to operate without regard for its
pollution would give the debtor an unfair advantage over its competitors. HIRSCH, supra
note 31, at 215.
13 See In re Chateaugay Corp, 944 F.2d. 997, 1009-10 (2d Cir. 1991). If there is a danger
posed by the exposure to hazardous waste which arises pre-petition, the debtor cannot dis-
regard an order to clean up the waste. Therefore, if the government cleans up the site post-
petition, it is entitled to reimbursement as an administrative expense because the debtor
"must maintain itself in compliance with applicable environmental laws." Id. at 1009.
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). Upon filing for bankruptcy, § 362 stays the "commence-
ment or continuation" of judicial or administrative actions against the debtor that could
have been initiated prior to the commencement of the proceedings. Id. § 362(a)(1).
" See WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, 1.09[1]. The purpose of the stay is two-
fold: (1) it gives the debtor time to organize its affairs in order to prepare for liquidation or
reorganization, without having to fight the claims of its creditors, and (2) it protects all
creditors by preventing the creditors who react quickly from depleting the assets of the
estate to the detriment of their slower counterparts. Id.; see also In re Mac Donald, 755
F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[A]utomatic stay gives the bankruptcy court an opportunity
to harmonize the interests of both debtor and creditors").
" See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(16). Among other things, the stay does not shield the
debtor from criminal actions, alimony payments, notice of tax deficiencies, or government,
police, or regulatory actions. Id.; see, e.g., Bean v. People, 72 B.R. 503, 505 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1987) (automatic stay not applicable to government actions to enforce criminal bail
proceedings).
'1 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The government's police and regulatory powers are designed to
protect the public "health, welfare, morals, and safety." See In re Ross, 83 B.R. 673, 675
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 104 B.R. 171 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989). A
governmental unit may bring an action against the debtor seeking to enforce compliance
with federal or state laws, including environmental laws, which are valid exercises of its
police or regulatory powers. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818
F.2d 1077, 1086 (3d Cir. 1987) (CERCLA action by U.S. pursuant to police and regulatory
power not subject to automatic stay); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 81 B.R. 310, 312
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (same), aff'd, 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988). But see NLRB v. Edward
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362(b)(5) from enforcing a money judgment.48 The question thus
arises as to whether an action under CERCLA is a valid exercise of
the EPA's police or regulatory powers pursuant to section
362(b)(4) or merely an attempt to enforce a money judgment pur-
suant to section 362(b)(5).49
The legislative history indicates that section 362(b)(4) was
designed to permit the government to pursue actions aimed at pro-
tecting the public health and safety, and not actions to protect its
"pecuniary interest."50 Thus, courts have held that an injunction
Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 941 (6th Cir. 1986) (not every government action ex-
cepted from stay).
"Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the stay under 362(a)(1) does not apply to affect the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to en-
force the governmental unit's police or regulatory power." 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6444.
'8 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988). See, e.g., In re 1600 Pasadena Offices'Ltd., 64 B.R. 192,
194 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (government not excepted from stay if seeking to enforce
money judgment); In re Hoffman, 53 B.R. 874, 875 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985) ("[G]overnment
action with a pecuniary purpose (debt collection) does not fall within the exception to [auto-
matic stay] allowing regulatory action against debtors or their estates in order to protect the
public health and safety."), aff'd, 65 B.R. 985 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986).
Allowing the government to enforce a money judgment would give it an unfair advan-
tage over other creditors subject to the stay. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 9, at 343,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6299; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 16, at 52, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5838. The government may enter a money judgment, but it may not
enforce it against the debtor. See WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, t 1.09[4].
" See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), (b)(5). The applicable subsections of 362(b) provide that:
The filing of a petition [in bankruptcy] ... does not operate as a stay-...
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to en-
force such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or pro-
ceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's po-
lice or regulatory power.
Id.; see, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (City's
action under CERCLA not stayed), afl'd in part, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1990); see also 2
COLLIER, supra note 16, 362.05[4] ("greatest amount of judicial activity under section
362(b)(4) has to do with the enforcement of environmental laws").
"0 See 124 CONG. REC. H11089, (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6444-45. In discussing the extent to which 362 (b)(4) exempts govern-
ment actions from the stay, Senator Edwards stated:
This section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit gov-
ernmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not
to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in prop-
erty of the debtor or property of the estate.
Id.; see also In re Aegean Fare, Inc., 35 B.R. 923, 927 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (government
actions "aimed at obtaining a pecuniary advantage" are stayed while actions representing
direct application of unit's police or regulatory power are not).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:55
ordering the debtor to cease and desist polluting is consistent with
the protection of the public welfare and is not subject to the auto-
matic stay.51 Courts disagree, however, as to whether injunctions
seeking to compel the debtor to clean up a hazardous site are the
equivalent of money judgments and therefore subject to the stay. 2
The courts that have refused to lift the stay on a government
agency's order to clean up contaminated property reason that com-
pelling the polluter to spend funds that the government could oth-
erwise spend itself is in essence an action aimed at protecting the
government's "pecuniary interest. '53
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Kovacs,54 stayed
the government's attempts to require the debtor to clean up a haz-
ardous waste disposal site. 6 After the polluter failed to comply
with an order to remove hazardous materials at its dump site, the
State of Ohio appointed a receiver to take possession of the pol-
luter's property and effect the cleanup order.6 Subsequently, the
polluter filed for bankruptcy, and the government sought to assert
" See, e.g., Brock v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 383, 388-89 (3d Cir. 1987);
In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1184-86 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1005 (1987); United States v. Ilco, Inc., 48 B.R. 1016, 1024 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
52 Compare Commonwealth Oil, 805 F.2d at 1186-89 (holding enforcement action re-
quiring compliance with environmental laws not stayed even though debtor would have to
expend funds) with In re Robinson, 46 B.R. 136, 139 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (concluding
government's order to clean up marsh land was equivalent of money judgment since it in-
volved direct expenditure of estate funds), rev'd on other grounds, 55 B.R. 355 (Bankr. D.C.
Fla. 1985). See also Richard J. DeMarco, Jr., Note, Clean-up Orders and the Bankruptcy
Code: An Exception to the Automatic Stay, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 292, 306-14 (1985) (dis-
cussing money judgments under § 362(b)(5)).
" See infra text accompanying notes 54-58.
681 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1982) (Kovacs I), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1167
(1983). The Kovacs decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in order to
determine whether the automatic stay issue had become moot. See id. at 1167. The moot-
ness issue arose because the bankruptcy court had held that the cleanup obligation was a
dischargeable debt, and the appeal of that decision was pending in the Sixth Circuit at the
time that the Supreme Court was addressing the automatic stay issue. See In re Kovacs, 29
B.R. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Ohio v.
Kovacs (Kovacs II), 469 U.S. 274 (1985). On remand, the Sixth Circuit held that the deci-
sion in Kovacs Il-discharging the debtor's environmental obligations-had rendered the
automatic stay issue moot in Kovacs L Kovacs I, 755 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court in Kovacs II accepted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Kovacs I and held
that where the debtor lacked the ability and resources to perform the cleanup, the state was
seeking no more than a money judgment as an alternative to requiring the debtor to person-
ally perform the obligations imposed by the injunction. See Kovacs H, 469 U.S. at 283-84
n.11.
" 681 F.2d at 456.
" Id. at 454.
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the cleanup order in the bankruptcy proceedings. 57 Recognizing
that the debtor could no longer personally perform the cleanup,
the court held that the state was seeking "what in essence
amounted to a money judgment." 8 Similarly, in United States v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,59 the district court refused to lift the
stay on an injunction requiring the cleanup of an asbestos waste
site because the action would involve "the expenditure of substan-
tial funds [of the estate]. ' '6O In addition, the Manville court was
concerned that diverting assets of the estate for the cleanup would
harm the victims of asbestos-related injuries who had claims
against the estate."
The majority of courts, however, will vacate the stay on a
cleanup order even though compliance may entail the expenditure
of estate funds.6 2 In Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environ-
mental Resources,63 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that an injunction to backfill a mine site was not an attempt
to enforce a money judgment, but rather a valid exercise of the
state's power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the pub-
lic pursuant to the language of section 362(a)(4).4 In its determi-
1 Id. at 455. After the debtor had filed for bankruptcy, the State of Ohio filed a motion
for a hearing to determine the debtor's current employment status and income. Id. The
debtor moved to have the action stayed pursuant to section 362(a). Id.
0' Id. at 456. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court's assessment that the
state sought the information on the debtor's income "'as a preliminary to requesting an
order from [the trial court] which would require that part of debtor's current income be
applied' to the receiver's efforts to complete [the debtor's] unfulfilled obligation to clean up
the industrial wastes." Id. at 455.
18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1177 (D.N.H. 1982).
60 Id. at 1178-79. In Manville, the United States and the State of New Hampshire
sought injunctions to require the Johns-Manville Sales Corporation to remove and abate the
dangers posed by its asbestos dump sites. Id.
61 Id. at 1181. The court stated that because there were other parties whom the govern-
ment could hold liable for cleanup obligations-as well as tens of thousands of current and
future claimants of asbestos-related injuries who would lose the opportunity to collect from
the debtor-it would not lift the stay on the government's motion. Id. at 1179 n.11, 1180-81.
The court also pointed out that the government could have removed the hazardous materi-
als itself. Id. at 1178.
62 See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1178 (5th Cir. 1986); Penn
Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Kaiser Steel
Corp., 87 B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 16, 1
362.0514].
63 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
'" Id. at 274-75. ("No more obvious exercise of the State's power to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of the public can be imagined."). The court stated that § 362(a)(4)
should be construed broadly, while § 362(a)(5) should be interpreted narrowly so as to leave
the states "as much of their police power as a fair reading of the statute allows." Id. at 273.
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nation, the court focused on whether the nature of the claim was
preventive or compensatory and stated that it is unlikely that an
action which "seeks to prevent culpable conduct in futuro will, in
normal course, manifest itself as an action for a money judg-
ment."6 5 In reversing both the bankruptcy and district courts, the
Third Circuit stated that the mere expenditure of funds will not
necessarily render an action one for money damages because "in
contemporary times, almost everything costs something."'6
This approach was extended in United States v. Standard
Metals Corp.,67 in which the court declined to stay the enforce-
ment of a $25,000 fine for violations of a settlement pursuant to
the Clean Water Act.8 Emphasizing that "[e]nvironmental laws
are enforced in a variety, of ways," the court held that a monetary
penalty was an appropriate enforcement mechanism of the govern-
ment's police and regulatory powers.6 9 The court acknowledged
that although the injunction might appear to protect the govern-
ment's pecuniary interest,70  the deterrence function of the fine
65 Id. at 277. The court stated that in determining whether an action is to enforce a
money judgment, the focus should be on whether the remedy would "compensate for past
wrongful acts resulting in injuries already suffered, or protect against potential future
harm." Id. (emphasis in original). The court held that the government's action was not in-
tended to provide compensation for past injuries. Id. at 278.
66 Id. The debtor relied on Kovacs I for the proposition that the expenditure of estate
funds is in essence a money judgment, regardless of how the government cloaks its claim. Id.
at 277. The court opined that the Kovacs I decision was unduly broad and if followed, would
narrow § 362(a)(4) into "virtual nonexistence." Id. at 278. "An injunction which does not
compel some expenditure or loss of monies may often be an effective nullity." Id. However,
the Supreme Court holding in Kovacs II may undermine the authority of this decision. See
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283-84 n.11 (1985) ("The automatic stay provision does not
apply to suits to enforce the regulatory statutes of the State, but the enforcement of such a
judgment by seeking money from the bankrupt ... is another matter.").
6" 49 B.R. 623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
68 Id. at 624. The debtor reached a settlement agreement with the government which
stipulated that the government would suspend a $25,000 fine for violation of the Clean
Water Act so long as the debtor "did not exceed certain effluent limitations" on zinc dis-
charges. Id. at 623. The government alleged that the debtor violated the agreement and
demanded payment of the fine. Id. at 624.
69 Id. at 624-25. The court noted that in addition to injunctive relief, the imposition of
a fine for the violation of environmental statutes is a valid exercise of the government's
police and regulatory power. Id. The fine was designed to "provide the [debtor] with an
incentive to exercise care to prevent releases of pollutants." Id. at 625 (emphasis in
original).
70 See id. at 625. "If consideration of the fine mechanism is confined to the time after
the release occurred, it may appear that the government is merely trying to protect a pecu-
niary interest in collecting the fine." Id.
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served to prevent the release of hazardous substances.71 Further-
more, the court cautioned that by imposing the stay, a party in a
"precarious financial condition" would have "little incentive to
guard against environmental pollution," thereby jeopardizing the
public's health, safety, and welfare.72
It is submitted that the majority view is correct in that requir-
ing the removal of hazardous waste is not the equivalent of enforc-
ing a money judgment within the, scope of section 362(b)(5). The
police and regulatory powers of the government are designed to
protect and promote the general public health, safety, and wel-
fare.73 Since an order to remove hazardous and toxic substances is
aimed directly at protecting the public's safety,74 it should not be
stayed solely because it will have the ancillary effect of requiring
the expenditure of estate funds.75 Moreover, the public health,
safety, and welfare is obviously paramount to the Code's policy of
7'1 See id.
72 Id. The imposition of a stay on the government's action would defeat the purpose of
§ 362(b)(4) which is, under the court's definition, "to prevent endangerment of the public
that would result from permitting a bankrupt to avoid statutes and regulations enacted in
furtherance of governmental police powers." Id.; see also United States v. Mattiace Indus.,
Inc., 73 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987). In Mattiace, the government brought an
action against the debtor seeking: (1) $1 million in response costs; (2) civil fines and punitive
damages for failure to comply with EPA cleanup orders; and (3) injunctive relief to prevent
and monitor further pollution. Id. at 816. The court held that the government's actions fell
within § 362(b)(4) so as to authorize lifting the stay. Id. at 819. "Even where the United
States seeks punitive damages or [cleanup costs] . . . thereby arguably protecting its own
pecuniary interest, the deterrence function of the relief sought will render the action one to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare." Id.
73 See In re Ross, 83 B.R. 673, 675 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 104
B.R. 171 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989).
7' See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 16, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5838;
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 9, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6299. The legis-
lative history behind the section 362(b)(4) exception states:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings
by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus, where a gov-
ernmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environ-
mentdl protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory
laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or pro-
ceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.
Id. (emphasis added). See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733
F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1984) ("No more obvious exercise of the State's power to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the public can be imagined."); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 87
B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (enforcing state's environmental laws constitutes
proper exercise of its regulatory or police powers).
75 See In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1187-88 (5th Cir. 1986) (com-
pelling compliance with environmental statute is not, in form or substance, action to enforce
money judgment), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
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allowing debtors a "breathing spell" from creditor's claims.76
III. ABANDONMENT OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the court may ap-
point a trustee to oversee and administer the debtor's estate.7 The
Bankruptcy Code grants trustees a potent arsenal of powers to
maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of general credi-
tors.7s Among these is the power to abandon any property of the
estate that is "burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequen-
tial value and benefit to the estate. '7 9 A trustee will abandon prop-
erty if it is so heavily encumbered by liens or security interests
that the expenses of maintaining the property outweigh the bene-
fits to the estate.8 0
The costs of complying with environmental laws such as CER-
CLA can quickly deplete a debtor's assets."1 If a hazardous waste
site is worth less than the cost of a cleanup, the trustee will at-
76 See Allen, supra note 11, at 1065-66 ("Congressional policy ... dictates that courts
favor protection of the public health and safety over protection of economic interests .... ).
77 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1104 (1988). If the debtor files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7
a court will automatically appoint a trustee to govern the estate. Id. § 701(a) ("Promptly
after the order for relief under [Chapter 7] ... to serve as interim trustee in the case"). In a
Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor may remain in possession of the estate because the goal
of Chapter 11 is the rehabilitation of the debtor, and often the debtor is the party best able
to accomplish this goal. 5 COLLIER, supra note 16, 1104.01 at 1104-16, 17 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 9, at 232-33, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6192). However, upon
request of creditors, or for showing of cause, the court can appoint a trustee to administer
the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). The trustee in bankruptcy is the representative of
the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a).
78 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 547, 548 (1988). A trustee can do many things in bankruptcy to
affect a creditor's rights which the debtor could not do outside of bankruptcy. For example,
a trustee can set aside certain liens, recover property that had previously been transferred
to third parties, assign contracts that contain anti-assignment clauses, and reject or assume
executory contracts and unexpired leases. See generally WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note
5, T 7 (trustee's powers).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 16, at 92, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5878. Once the trustee abandons the property, the propgrty reverts
back to the debtor as if the bankruptcy was never commenced, or to another party holding a
possessory interest in the property. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 16, 554.02[2].
" See In re K.C. Mach & Tool Co., 816 F.2d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 1986) (permitting trus-
tee to abandon property not beneficial to estate); Bryson v. Bank of New York, 584 F. Supp.
1306, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (allowing trustee to abandon any asset deemed to be less valua-
ble than cost of recovering it); In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 B.R. 994, 998 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1987) ("The underlying purpose of abandonment is to allow the trustee to efficiently reduce
the debtor's property to money for distribution to creditors."), afl'd, 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir.
1988).
" See supra note 3 (staggering costs of removal actions).
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tempt to abandon the contaminated property rather than incur the
cleanup costs.8 2 However, courts have refused to allow a trustee to
abandon property where doing so would pose an "imminent dan-
ger" to the public's health and safety.83
In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection,4 the United States Supreme Court
held that a trustee cannot abandon property in contravention of a
state or federal environmental statute which is "reasonably
designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards.""s The Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not
intend the Code's abandonment provision to preempt state and lo-
cal laws.86 Central to the Court's decision was its concern that
abandoning the property would present an "imminent and sub-
stantial" danger to the public's health. 7
81 In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565-66 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (estimating
cost of cleanup to be at least $2.5 million while land worth $100,000).
83 In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (disallowing abandonment
because burial of pesticides constituted immediate danger to public health); In re Stevens,
68 B.R. 774, 780 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987) (disallowing abandonment of drums containing
PCB's because it would pose health threat to public).
8- 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
85 Id. at 507.
88 Id. at 505-06. The Court relied in part on 28 U.S.C. § 959 (1983) which allows the
trustee or debtor in possession to be sued by third parties and therefore requires that the
estate be managed and operated in conformance with all applicable laws. Id. Section 959
provides in pertinent part:
(a) [tirustees, receivers or managers of any property, including debtors in posses-
sion, may be sued .... with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying
on business connected with such property ....
(b) . . . a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any
court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and
operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager accord-
ing to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is
situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound
to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959 (1988); see, e.g., In re Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 125 B.R. 546, 548
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (requiring trustee to comply with environmental laws).
81 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1983)). In Midlantic, the debtor,
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta), processed waste oil at two of its facilities. Id. at
497. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) discovered that
Quanta had accepted several thousand gallons of oil contaminated with polychlorinated
bipheynls (PCB's) in violation of its operating permit. Id. NJDEP issued an administrative
order requiring Quanta to clean up the site. Id. Pursuant to § 554, the trustee attempted to
abandon the two facilities because cleaning up the property and maintaining full-time secur-
ity guards to prevent trespassing by outsiders created financial burdens, and the property
was of inconsequential value to the estate. Id. at 498. The bankruptcy court approved the
abandonment, concluding that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every respect
than either the Trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done to protect the
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The Court noted, however, that its holding was narrow and
did not encompass speculative or indeterminate future violation of
environmental laws.88 Thus, subsequent courts have limited
Midlantic's holding to cases involving property which creates an
imminent danger89 and have permitted abandonment when it does
not threaten the public health and safety, even though such action
violates state or federal statutes.9 0
Moreover, the Midlantic decision does not absolutely bar
trustees from abandoning contaminated property91 because the Su-
preme Court expressly declined to resolve the issue of whether
''certain state laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so
onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself."92
Often, forced compliance with environmental statutes can elimi-
nate any possibility of a successful reorganization.9 3 Therefore,
courts must balance the risks to the public against the advantage
to creditors in determining whether abandonment should be al-
lowed or whether the trustee must comply with the environmental
laws.94
public against the dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." Id. The district court
affirmed. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, stating that
"[i]f trustees in bankruptcy are to be permitted to dispose of hazardous waste under the
cloak of the abandonment power, compliance with environmental protection laws will be
transformed into governmental cleanup by default." In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
912, 921 (3d Cir. 1984).
88 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9.
89 See In re Corona Plastics, Inc., 99 B.R. 231, 235-36 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989); In re
Purco, Inc., 76 B.R. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R.
268, 271-72 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
1o See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988). In Smith-
Douglass, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's finding
that "unconditional abandonment was appropriate in light of the estate's lack of unencum-
bered assets, coupled with the absence of serious public health and safety risks." Id.; see
also In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, Inc., 119 B.R. 45, 50-51 (D.N.J. 1990) (permitting
trustee to abandon public water supply system in contravention of state environmental reg-
ulations where no showing of "imminent and identifiable harm" to public); In re Franklin
Signal, 65 B.R. at 273-74 (allowing trustee to abandon 14 drums of chemicals because estate
had sufficient funds to dispose of them and no threat to public).
N Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
92 Id.
" See In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565-66 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) ("To
require strict compliance with State environmental laws ... would derogate the spirit and
purpose of the bankruptcy laws requiring prompt and effectual administration within a lim-
ited time period.").
" See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABLITY
CONCLUSION
The dischargeability of CERCLA liability in bankruptcy
removes a debtor's incentives to use its resources to clean up haz-
ardous materials or otherwise comply with environmental regula-
tions. On the other hand, narrowing potentially dischargeable
claims, at least to those which the EPA is aware of, appropriately
balances bankruptcy's fresh start policy with CERCLA's aim of
protecting the public health, safety, and welfare. Furthermore,
conferring administrative priority to CERCLA claims, enforcing
injunctions requiring debtors to cease polluting or clean up waste,
and preventing trustees from abandoning dangerous property will
all ensure that responsible parties pay for their damage to the en-
vironment and will actually provide incentives for debtors to com-
ply with environmental laws. To date, many courts have accorded
priority to the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code at the ex-
pense of CERCLA's goal of protecting the environment. It is sub-
mitted, however, both as a matter of law and of policy, that the
protection of society as a whole must take precedence over the re-
habilitation of individual and corporate debtors.
J. Ricky Arriola
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